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KILLING TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE: 
HOW AN INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT 
PROGRAM UNDER THE MBTA CAN HELP 
COMPANIES AND MIGRATORY BIRDS 
Krisztina Nadasdy* 
Abstract: Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), it is unlawful to 
kill a migratory bird “by any means, or in any manner” without a permit. 
The United States has interpreted the language “by any means, or in any 
manner” to include the incidental killing of birds. In conflict with this in-
terpretation, however, is the fact that permits for the incidental killing of 
migratory birds are not issued under the MBTA. This current system 
hurts both migratory birds and the entities whose commercial activities 
might result in migratory bird deaths. Birds continue to die in large 
numbers while entities cannot acquire permits to assure compliance with 
the MBTA. This Note explores the current state of the law regarding the 
incidental killing of migratory birds and concludes that a meaningful in-
cidental take permit program would reduce migratory bird deaths and 
provide commercial entities with a means to assure their compliance with 
the MBTA. 
Introduction 
 In 1916, the United States negotiated a treaty with Canada for the 
protection of migratory birds.1 As both countries agreed, migratory 
birds “are of great value as a source of food or in destroying insects . . . 
but are nevertheless in danger of extermination through lack of ade-
quate protection.”2 In 1918, the United States executed the treaty by 
enacting the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), which imposes crimi-
nal penalties on persons, associations, partnerships, or corporations 
that kill migratory birds without permission from the government.3 In-
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2013–
2014. 
1 Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migra-
tory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 [hereinafter U.S.-Gr. Brit. Treaty]. 
Great Britain negotiated the treaty on behalf of Canada. See id. 
2 Id. 
3 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755, 755–56 (1918) (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006)). 
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terested parties may obtain permission to kill a certain amount of birds 
by requesting permits from the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).4 
 The predominant threat to migratory bird populations in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was large-scale, unmitigated 
hunting, poaching, and capture of birds for market.5 Early prosecu-
tions under the MBTA reflected these direct threats to birds, such as 
hunting and capture without a permit.6 Currently, however, migratory 
birds are threatened by a vast array of activities not directed at birds, 
such as operations involving power lines, wind energy, airplanes, and oil 
drilling.7 These activities contribute greatly to the total amount of birds 
killed; for example, four million to five million birds are killed annually 
because of collisions with communications towers.8 
 Bird deaths that result from activities not directed at birds are 
known as incidental takes.9 The government prosecutes entities whose 
activities kill birds incidentally, but the FWS has not promulgated regu-
lations that would allow those entities to obtain permits and comply with 
the law.10 Without permits, entities whose activities might result in inci-
dental takes must commence operations with uncertainty as to the legal-
                                                                                                                      
4 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2012). 
5 See George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 165, 168 (1979); Meredith Blaydes Lilley & 
Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 
Envtl. L. 1167, 1177–78 (2008). 
6 See Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 182; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1181. 
7 Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1172–73. 
8 Albert M. Manville, II, Towers, Turbines, Power Lines, and Buildings—Steps Being Taken by 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Avoid or Minimize Take of Migratory Birds at These Structures, 
in Proceedings of the Fourth International Partners in Flight Conference: Tun-
dra to Tropics 262, 263–64 (2009), available at http://www.partnersinflight.org/pubs/ 
mcallenproc/articles/pif09_anthropogenic%20impacts/manville_pif09.pdf and http:// 
www.perma.cc/0tp4TwrVsjx; see U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Migratory Bird Mortality: 
Many Human-Caused Threats Afflict our Bird Populations 1–2 (2002), available at 
www.fws.gov/birds/mortality-fact-sheet.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0S5J6qUfPj4 [herein-
after Bird Mortality Fact Sheet]. 
9 See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (D.N.D. 
2012); Julie Lurman, Agencies in Limbo: Migratory Birds and Incidental Take By Federal Agencies, 
23 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 39, 40 (2007). 
10 See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 2010) (prose-
cution of oil and gas operator); United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 
1070, 1071 (D. Colo. 1999) (prosecution of rural electric cooperative); United States v. 
Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 514–15 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 578 
F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecution of pesticide distributor); 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.1–.61 
(2012) (describing types of migratory bird permits and notably not including civilian inci-
dental take permits); Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forc-
es, 72 Fed. Reg. 8931, 8932 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2012)) (“Current 
regulations. . . . do not expressly address the issuance of permits for incidental take.”). 
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ity of their actions.11 Courts have added to the confusion by taking di-
vergent stances on the issue with some even concluding that the MBTA’s 
prohibition on killing birds does not apply to incidental killing.12 
 The current system to address incidental takes is insufficient and 
wrought with uncertainty, and it does not further the protection of mi-
gratory birds.13 A large portion of the bird species that the MBTA pro-
tects are endangered or might soon be listed as endangered if addi-
tional protective measures are not taken.14 The meaningful regulation 
of incidental takes, however, might reduce the amount of birds killed.15 
 This Note argues that the FWS should use its regulatory authority 
under the MBTA to promulgate regulations for incidental takes in the 
form of incidental take permits.16 Part I gives a brief history of migrato-
ry bird protection in the United States followed by a detailed look at 
the migratory bird treaties and the MBTA itself.17 Part II explores judi-
cial interpretation of incidental takes under the MBTA and existing 
mechanisms to address incidental takes.18 Part III argues that the FWS 
has the authority to regulate incidental takes and that the current sys-
tem is inadequate.19 This Note concludes that the FWS should promul-
gate regulations for incidental take permits and that incidental take 
permits would further the protection of migratory birds.20 
                                                                                                                      
11 Holland & Hart LLC, Development of a Permit Program for Incidental 
Take of Migratory Birds 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id= 
11062 and http://www.perma.cc/0xgz7phjzEi; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1199. 
12 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (listing a number of cases that have applied the 
MBTA to unintentional takings and holding instead that unintentional takings are outside 
the scope of the MBTA); infra notes 75–112 and accompanying text. 
13 Infra notes 194–243 and accompanying text; see Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 
1208–09. 
14 Manville, supra note 8, at 262; Am. Bird Conservancy, Rulemaking Petition to 
the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service for Regulating the Impacts of Wind Energy Pro-
jects on Migratory Birds 10 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://www.abcbirds.org/abc 
programs/policy/collisions/pdf/wind_rulemaking_petition.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/ 
072xt7VE4ar [hereinafter ABC Rulemaking Petition]; N. Am. Bird Conservation Initia-
tive, U.S. Comm., et al., The State of the Birds United States of America 2009, at 4 
(2009), available at http://www.stateofthebirds.org/2009/pdf_files/State_of_the_Birds_ 
2009.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/02gi9FGJ5C2 [hereinafter State of the Birds]. 
15 Conrad A. Fjetland, Possibilities for Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act for the Pro-
tection of Migratory Birds, 40 Nat. Resources J. 47, 67 (2000). 
16 Infra notes 162–269 and accompanying text. 
17 Infra notes 21–70 and accompanying text. 
18 Infra notes 71–161 and accompanying text. 
19 Infra notes 162–243 and accompanying text. 
20 Infra notes 244–269 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
A. Background on Migratory Bird Protection in the United States 
 In the late 1800s, a combination of the population’s aversion to 
regulation and belief that wildlife was an infinite resource created a 
bleak situation for many bird species.21 Many citizens had a general dis-
dain for wilderness and wildlife and “believed that wild animals best 
served them in the market—as a choice dinner course or tailored into a 
coat or hat—rather than roaming the frontier.”22 Birds were an im-
portant source of food and income for many people, and in the absence 
of government regulation, people slaughtered them at an alarming 
pace and brought some species to the brink of extinction.23 Attempts to 
regulate what citizens believed was their right to use and exploit wildlife 
for profit, sustenance, and sport were weak or non-existent.24 
 Perhaps the most striking example is the plight of the passenger 
pigeon, which was the most abundant bird species in North America in 
the early 1800s.25 The birds became popular in meat markets and were 
caught and killed in large numbers.26 For example, the small town of 
Hartford, Michigan sent almost twelve million pigeons to various meat 
markets in a forty-day period in 1869.27 A lack of government regula-
tion also contributed to the population decline.28 By the mid-1800s, the 
population of passenger pigeons was decreasing, and in 1914 the last 
one died in the Cincinnati Zoo.29 
 Beginning in 1900, Congress attempted to implement various 
comprehensive bird protections.30 First, Congress enacted the Lacey 
Act, which prohibited transportation of illegally killed birds across state 
lines.31 The Lacey Act, however, was poorly enforced.32 In 1913, Con-
gress enacted the Weeks-McLean Act, which prohibited the killing of 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The 
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 Envtl. L. 673, 685, 690 (2005); 
Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 167–68; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1177. 
22 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 21, at 686–87. 
23 Id. at 685, 687, 690, 692; Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 168. 
24 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 21, at 690; Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 168. 
25 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 21, at 691; State of the Birds, supra note 14, at 3. 
26 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 21, at 691. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 690 & n.110, 691. 
29 Id. at 692. 
30 Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1178–79. 
31 The Lacey Act, ch. 553, § 3, 31 Stat. 187, 188 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2006)); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1178. 
32 Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1178. 
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certain birds without permission from the federal government.33 Vari-
ous courts, however, quickly declared that the Weeks-McLean Act was 
unconstitutional.34 
 In 1916, after these unsuccessful attempts at regulation, the Secre-
tary of State negotiated a protectionist bird treaty with Canada.35 This 
treaty led to the enactment of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) in 
1918, which imposed criminal penalties on persons, associations, part-
nerships, or corporations that killed birds without permission from the 
government.36 
B. The Migratory Bird Treaties 
 The United States has negotiated four migratory bird treaties.37 
President Woodrow Wilson signed the first migratory bird treaty in 
1916 with Canada.38 The United States later negotiated migratory bird 
                                                                                                                      
33 Weeks-McLean Law of 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847–48; Lilley & Firestone, supra 
note 5, at 1178–79. 
34 United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 294–96 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v. 
Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1179. 
35 U.S.-Gr. Brit. Treaty, supra note 1, at 1702; Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 169. The 
birds protected under the treaty were those migrating between the United States and Can-
ada. Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 169. 
36 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755, 755–56 (1918) (codified as amend-
ed at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006)). 
37 Convention Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647 [hereinafter U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty]; Convention Be-
tween the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan for 
the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environ-
ment, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Treaty]; Convention 
Between the United States of America and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory Birds 
and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter U.S.-Mex. Treaty]; 
U.S.-Gr. Brit. Treaty, supra note 1, at 1705. 
38 U.S.-Gr. Brit. Treaty, supra note 1, at 1705. In 1995, the parties negotiated a protocol 
that replaced the original treaty. Protocol Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Canada Amending the 1916 Convention Between the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America for the Protection of Migratory Birds in 
Canada and the United States, U.S.-Can., Dec. 14, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104–28 [here-
inafter U.S.-Can. 1995 Protocol]. The 1995 protocol sets forth broad conservation goals 
and commits the parties to “long-term conservation” using a “comprehensive international 
framework” that includes the regulation of takes. Id. The protocol sets conservation prin-
ciples such as providing for sustainable uses of birds, habitat conservation, and population 
restoration, and it suggests monitoring, regulation, and enforcement to achieve these 
goals. Id. 
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treaties with the governments of Mexico, Japan, and the Union of Sovi-
et Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.).39 
 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a treaty for the protection 
of migratory birds between the United States and Mexico in 1937.40 
The convention with Mexico declares it “right and proper to protect 
birds denominated as migratory . . . by means of adequate methods 
which will permit . . . the utilization of said birds rationally for purposes 
of sport, food, commerce and industry.”41 The convention binds the 
parties to “establish laws, regulations and provisions” to carry out the 
conservation purposes of the Act.42 
 President Gerald R. Ford signed a treaty in 1974 between the 
United States and Japan for the protection of migratory birds.43 The 
United States and Japan found birds to be of “great value for recrea-
tional, aesthetic, scientific, and economic purposes, and that this value 
can be increased with proper management.”44 The Japan treaty prohib-
its the illegal killing of migratory birds, but allows contracting parties to 
permit killings “[f]or scientific, educational, propagative or other spe-
cific purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention.”45 
 President Jimmy Carter signed the last of the migratory bird trea-
ties with the U.S.S.R. in 1978.46 The contracting parties agreed that mi-
gratory birds are of “great scientific, economic, aesthetic, cultural, edu-
cational, recreational and ecological value and that this value can be 
increased under proper management.”47 The convention prohibits the 
killing of migratory birds except in limited circumstances, including for 
“specific purposes not inconsistent with the principles of th[e] Conven-
tion.”48 
 The MBTA implements the terms of these four bilateral migratory 
bird conventions.49 The terms of the conventions guide the purpose of 
the MBTA and set forth conservation goals to which the contracting 
                                                                                                                      
39 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 37, at 4647; U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 37, at 3329; 
U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 37, at 1311. 
40 U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 37, at 1316. 
41 Id. at 1312. 
42 Id. 
43 U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 37, at 3330. 
44 Id. at 3331. 
45 Id. at 3333. 
46 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 37, at 4647–48. 
47 Id. at 4649. 
48 Id. at 4651–52. 
49 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a), 704(a), 712(2) (2006). 
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parties must adhere in developing their domestic statutes and regula-
tions.50 
C. The MBTA: Statutory Provisions and Regulations 
 The MBTA is a criminal statute with a broad prohibition against 
the killing of migratory birds.51 The Act protects more than one thou-
sand species of birds.52 The Secretary of the Interior, acting through 
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), has the authority to enforce the 
provisions of the Act.53 The MBTA does not provide a private right of 
action.54 
1. Section 703(a): The Prohibition on Taking and Killing 
 The MBTA prohibits the taking and killing of migratory birds.55 
Section 703(a) of the MBTA states in pertinent part: “Unless and ex-
cept as permitted by regulations . . . it shall be unlawful at any time, by 
any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, at-
tempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, [or] sell . . . any 
migratory bird.”56 The statute does not define the term “take,” but it is 
preceded by the phrase “at any time, by any means or in any manner.”57 
The regulations made pursuant to the MBTA define the term “take” as 
“to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or at-
tempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”58 
2. Section 707: The Penalty Provision 
 A violation of the MBTA may result in either felony or misde-
meanor penalties.59 The felony provision is narrow and can only be 
                                                                                                                      
50 See id.; U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 37, at 4649; U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 37, 
at 3331; U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 37, at 1312; U.S.-Gr. Brit. Treaty, supra note 1, at 1702. 
51 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a), 707. 
52 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2012); Official Number of Protected Migratory Bird Species Climbs to 
More Than 1,000, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (Mar. 1, 2010), 
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/ 
news/184.html, available at http://www.perma.cc/0GjV8aFhF6r. 
53 16 U.S.C. §§ 704(a), 706; 50 C.F.R. § 10.1. 
54 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (notably lacking provisions allowing private citizen suits). 
55 See id. § 703(a). 
56 Id. 
57 See id. §§ 703–712 (notably not including a definitions section). The specific word-
ing of the section at issue can be found in § 703(a). Id. § 703(a). 
58 50 C.F.R. § 10.12. 
59 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)–(b). For misdemeanor violations, the punishment is a fine of no 
more than $15,000 and/or a maximum jail sentence of six months. Id. § 707(a). For felony 
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used on entities that knowingly take migratory birds and sell or barter 
them, or have an intent to do so.60 The misdemeanor provision is 
broad and leaves vulnerable to punishment any person, association, 
corporation, or partnership that violates any part of the Act or fails to 
comply with any regulations promulgated under the Act.61 
 The misdemeanor provision, unlike the felony provision, contains 
no mental state requirement.62 A violation of the MBTA that results in 
misdemeanor penalties is a strict liability crime, which means that no 
intent on the part of the defendant is required.63 In United States v. 
Reese, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee in 
1939 addressed the issue on first impression, and the court reasoned 
that Congress intended to create substantive protections for migratory 
birds, and thus intentionally omitted a scienter requirement.64 Since 
Reese, courts have consistently found that intent is not required for mis-
demeanor convictions under the MBTA.65 Congress has also acknowl-
edged the strict liability standard.66 
3. Section 704(a): Authority to Regulate 
 Section 704(a) allows the Secretary of the Interior to permit the 
taking of migratory birds under certain circumstances.67 The section 
states in pertinent part: 
                                                                                                                      
violations, the punishment is a fine of no more than $2,000 and/or a maximum jail sen-
tence of two years. Id. § 707(b). 
60 Id. § 707(b). 
61 Id. § 707(a). 
62 See id. § 707(a)–(b) (illustrating that the felony provision requires intent or 
knowledge, but the misdemeanor provision requires neither). 
63 United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 
259 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Reese, 27 F. Supp. 833, 835 (W.D. Tenn. 1939); S. Rep. 
No. 99–445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128. 
64 27 F. Supp. at 835. 
65 Manning, 787 F.2d at 435 n.4; United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 
1984); Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Strict Criminal Liability for Non-
Hunting, Human Caused Bird Deaths, 77 Denv. U. L. Rev. 315, 318 & n.17 (1999). 
66 S. Rep. No. 99–445, at 16. In 1986, Congress amended the MBTA to add “knowingly” 
as a mental state requirement to the felony provision. Emergency Wetlands Resources Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–645, § 501, 100 Stat. 3582, 3590. The accompanying Senate report 
stated: “Nothing in this amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for 
misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in 
many Federal court decisions.” S. Rep. No. 99–445, at 16. 
67 16 U.S.C. § 704(a). Section 712(2) restates the Secretary’s authority to promulgate 
regulations to carry out the terms of the treaties. See id. § 712(2). 
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[T]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed, 
from time to time, . . . to determine when, to what extent, if at 
all, and by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the 
conventions to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, posses-
sion, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation, carriage, or 
export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, and 
to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing the 
same.68 
The Secretary has used § 704(a) to promulgate regulations allowing for 
migratory bird hunting and permits.69 FWS has created permit schemes 
for: import, export, banding or marking, scientific collecting, taxider-
my, waterfowl sale and disposal, special purposes, falconry, propaga-
tion, rehabilitation, depredation, military readiness activities, and pop-
ulation control.70 
II. Incidental Takes and the MBTA 
 Before the 1970s, prosecutions under the MBTA were predomi-
nantly against those who engaged in illegal conduct directed at birds, 
such as hunting and poaching without a permit.71 In the 1970s, the 
government began prosecuting entities under the Act whose conduct 
was not directed at birds but resulted in incidental bird deaths.72 Neither 
the language of the MBTA nor its legislative history addresses the scope 
of the term take and whether it includes incidental takes.73 Conse-
                                                                                                                      
68 Id. § 704(a). 
69 50 C.F.R. pt. 20 (2012) (hunting regulations); 50 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2012) (migratory 
bird permits). 
70 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.21 (import and export), 21.22 (banding or marking), 21.23 (scien-
tific collecting), 21.24 (taxidermy), 21.25 (waterfowl sale and disposal), 21.27 (special 
purpose), 21.29 (falconry), 21.30 (propagation), 21.31 (rehabilitation), 21.41–.51 (depre-
dation), 21.15 (military readiness), 21.60–.61 (population control) (2012). 
71 Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 182; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1181. 
72 Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 183; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1181; see 
United States v. Union Tex. Petroleum, No. 73-CR-127, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616, at *1–
3 (D. Colo. July 11, 1973) (illustrating the prosecution of an oil company for the deaths of 
migratory birds in open oil sludge pits); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 903–04 
(2nd Cir. 1978) (illustrating the prosecution of a pesticide manufacturer for the deaths of 
migratory birds in a wastewater pit). 
73 See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006) (lacking a definitions 
section); United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1082 (D. Colo. 
1999) (“[T]here is no clearly expressed legislative intent that the MBTA regulates only 
physical conduct associated with hunting or poaching.”). 
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quently, courts have reached divergent conclusions as to the scope of 
the MBTA regarding incidental takes.74 
A. Judicial Interpretation of Incidental Takes Under the MBTA 
 United States v. Union Texas Petroleum in 1973 is among the first cases 
that the federal government prosecuted that involved incidental 
takes.75 The government charged a company with violating the MBTA 
after dead birds were found in its uncovered oil sludge pits.76 The 
company was engaged in petroleum extraction, which is not an action 
directed at birds or intended to cause bird deaths.77 The company filed 
a motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the MBTA did not 
apply because the company’s conduct was not directed at birds.78 The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado denied the motion and 
stated that “given the broad purposes of the Act and [its] language . . . 
we doubt that the statute was intended to be limited to hunting or oth-
er purposeful killing alone.”79 The court deferred further inquiry into 
the defendant’s liability and the MBTA’s scope until trial, but the de-
fendant pled guilty, and these questions were left unanswered.80 
 In 1978, the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit addressed the 
issue of incidental takes directly.81 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. FMC Corp.82 In that 
case, a pesticide manufacturer appealed a jury verdict against it for vio-
lation of the MBTA.83 The defendant’s manufacturing process pro-
duced a large amount of wastewater, which should have been treated 
before release.84 Unbeknownst to the defendant, the treatment system 
was broken, and many birds died after drinking the wastewater.85 The 
                                                                                                                      
74 Infra notes 75–112 and accompanying text. 
75 Union Tex. Petroleum, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616, at *3; Lilley & Firestone, supra 
note 5, at 1181. 
76 Union Tex. Petroleum, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616, at *3. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. at *1–3. 
79 Id. at *3, 9. 
80 Id. at *9; Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 184. 
81 See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905–08(discussing the application of the MBTA to the in-
advertent poisoning of migratory birds); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 
510, 531–36 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing 
whether the MBTA applies to poisoning migratory birds without any intent). 
82 See 572 F.2d at 905–08 (discussing the application of the MBTA to the inadvertent 
poisoning of migratory birds). 
83 Id. at 903–04. 
84 Id. at 904. 
85 Id. at 905. 
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defendant attempted to scare birds away from the pond with floating 
devices, loud noises, and guards, but these solutions were ineffective.86 
The defendant was convicted for killing ninety-two birds between April 
11 and June 25, 1975.87 On appeal, the court found that although the 
defendant did not intend to harm the birds, the important public poli-
cy behind the MBTA and the dangerousness of defendant’s product 
was sufficient to convict the defendant.88 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed inci-
dental takes in United States v. Corbin Farm Service.89 In that case, a pesti-
cide distributor dispersed pesticides over a field, which resulted in the 
death of a large number of protected migratory birds.90 The company 
argued that its actions were outside the scope of the MBTA because it 
was not engaged in bird hunting or capture, and the bird deaths were 
inadvertent.91 The court disagreed and reasoned that the expansiveness 
of the statutory language, “by any means or in any manner,” may in-
clude poisoning.92 The court also noted that the MBTA’s legislative his-
tory revealed no intention to exclude bird poisoning as a punishable 
offense.93 The court, in finding the defendant’s intent argument un-
persuasive, also stated that it could impose criminal liability for “those 
who did not intend to kill migratory birds.”94 In denying the defend-
ant’s motion to dismiss, the court did not reach a holding on defend-
ant’s liability but suggested that a lack of reasonable care in spraying 
pesticides could be a factor in liability.95 
 In 1998, in United States v. Moon Lake Electric Association, the issue of 
incidental takes found its way back to the District of Colorado.96 In 
Moon Lake, the government prosecuted a rural electrical distribution 
cooperative that supplied electricity to an oil field in Colorado via pow-
er poles and lines.97 Various species of birds used the power poles to 
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 903, 905. 
88 FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 908. 
89 See Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 531. 
90 Id. at 514–15. 
91 Id. at 531–32. 
92 Id. at 532 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703(a)). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 536. 
95 See Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 536 (foregoing the question of defendant’s guilt 
but discussing the requirement of reasonable care nonetheless). The court reasoned that a 
person spraying pesticides can be in a position to foresee possible danger and act to pre-
vent it. Id. at 535. 
96 Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
97 Id. 
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perch and roost, and thirty-eight birds were electrocuted because the 
cooperative failed to install protective equipment on many of the 
poles.98 The cooperative filed a motion to dismiss and claimed that it 
did not violate the MBTA because it was not engaged in hunting or 
poaching and the bird deaths were unintentional.99 
 The court affirmed its existing precedent that a misdemeanor vio-
lation of the MBTA is a strict liability crime and that intent is not re-
quired.100 The court found that the statutory language is not ambigu-
ous and prohibits the taking or killing of birds “by any means or in any 
manner” without reference to whether that killing is intentional or un-
intentional, direct or indirect.101 Furthermore, the legislative history 
indicated no intent to narrow the Act to hunting and poaching.102 The 
court further indicated that the reach of the MBTA is limited by prox-
imate causation, because bird deaths must be “reasonably anticipated 
or foreseen as a natural consequence of the wrongful act.”103 
 In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided 
United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., where the court addressed proximate 
causation directly.104 In that case, two Kansas oil operators, Apollo and 
Walker, were convicted for violating the misdemeanor provision of the 
MBTA after dead birds were found lodged in both operators’ equip-
ment.105 The court, applying the reasoning in Moon Lake, found that to 
uphold the convictions Apollo and Walker must have proximately 
caused the bird deaths.106 The court found that Apollo proximately 
caused the bird deaths because Apollo knew its equipment had killed 
birds in the past and had received information as part of an FWS aware-
ness campaign regarding bird deaths in oil operating equipment.107 The 
court dismissed some charges against Walker, however, because at the 
time he had not been informed about the effects of his equipment on 
birds and had no prior experience with birds dying in his equipment.108 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. at 1071–72. 
99 Id. at 1072. 
100 Id. at 1073–74. 
101 Id. at 1078, 1079 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703(a)). 
102 Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. 
103 Id. at 1085 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1225 (6th Ed. 
1990). 
104 611 F.3d 679, 679, 682, 689–91 (10th Cir. 2010). 
105 Id. at 682. 
106 Id. at 690. 
107 See id. at 682–83, 691 (finding that Apollo must have reasonably anticipated and 
foreseen the bird deaths as a natural consequence of its use of oil drilling equipment). 
108 Id. at 691. Walker was charged with violations in 2007 and 2008. Id. The court dis-
missed the 2007 charge for lack of foreseeability but upheld the 2008 charge. Id. 
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 In United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., the U.S. District Court for 
the District of North Dakota in 2012 diverged from the developing 
precedent of foreseeability as a limit on strict liability.109 In that case, the 
government charged multiple oil and gas companies with MBTA viola-
tions after migratory birds were found dead and oiled in reserve pits.110 
Each company had violated the MBTA on prior occasions, and the FWS 
had informed the companies about dangers that reserve pits pose to 
migratory birds.111 Despite this background, the court dismissed the 
case and held that the MBTA does not apply to incidental takes and only 
applies to conduct directed at birds, such as hunting and poaching.112 
B. Existing Incidental Take Regulations and Guidance Under the MBTA 
 The existing mechanisms to deal with incidental takes under the 
MBTA are minimal.113 FWS regulations allow for special purpose per-
mits and incidental takes for military readiness exercises.114 The FWS 
has also published a series of voluntary guidelines to help certain in-
dustries mitigate their impacts on migratory birds.115 
                                                                                                                      
109 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1202, 1211 (D.N.D. 2012) (“Like timber harvesting, oil de-
velopment and production activities are not the sort of physical conduct engaged in by 
hunters and poachers, and such activities do not fall under the prohibitions of the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act.”). 
110 Id. at 1203. 
111 E.g., Statement of Probable Cause at 4, Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (No. 4:11-po-
00005-DLH). 
112 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1203, 1211. The Brigham court relied on narrow state-
ments about the applicability of the MBTA from citizen suit cases brought under the APA 
that were premised on possible future bird deaths from timber harvesting operations. Id. 
at 1209 (discussing Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 114–15 
(8th Cir. 1997)). Other courts have declined to follow these cases. Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d 
at 685 (acknowledging Newton County but declining to follow); Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 
1085 (explicitly rejecting Newton County and similar cases). 
113 Infra notes 116–161 and accompanying text. 
114 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.15, 21.27 (2012). 
115 Memorandum from Jamie Rappaport Clark, Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., to Reg’l 
Dirs., Regions 1–7, 2 (Sept. 14, 2000), http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/com_tow_ 
guidelines.pdf, available at http://www.perma.cc/0mB4tR239xk [hereinafter Communica-
tion Tower Guidelines]; The Edison Electric Inst.’s Avian Power Line Interaction 
Comm. & U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Avian Protection Plan (APP) Guidelines 1 
(2005), available at http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/CurrentBirdIssues/Hazards/APP/ 
AVIAN%20PROTECTION%20PLAN%20FINAL%204%2019%2005.pdf and http://www. 
perma.cc/0V625TbJFga; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines 1 (2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/wind 
energy/docs/WEG_final.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0LfoQUWSsiF [hereinafter Land-
Based Wind Energy Guidelines]. 
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1. FWS Regulations 
a. Special Purpose Permits 
 The FWS has promulgated a regulation allowing for the issuance 
of special purpose permits for activities related to migratory birds but 
not typically allowed by other permits.116 The FWS may grant a special 
purpose permit if an applicant requests a permit for an activity “related 
to migratory birds, their parts, nests, or eggs . . . and makes a sufficient 
showing of benefit to the migratory bird resource, important research 
reasons, reasons of human concern for individual birds, or other com-
pelling justification.”117 
 The FWS issues special purpose permits in conjunction with En-
dangered Species Act (ESA) incidental take permits.118 Under the ESA, 
entities whose actions might result in the incidental take of endangered 
species may apply for an incidental take permit (ITP).119 Several migra-
tory birds protected under the MBTA, however, are concurrently listed 
under the ESA.120 Without a special purpose permit under the MBTA, 
an entity with an ESA ITP for a concurrently listed species would be in 
violation of the MBTA when a take occurs.121 
 The FWS decision to issue special purpose permits in conjunction 
with the ESA ITPs was based on a memorandum by the Assistant Solici-
tor of the Fish and Wildlife branch within the Department of the Inte-
rior.122 In the memorandum, the Assistant Solicitor highlighted some 
legal obstacles to using the special purpose permit provision of the 
MBTA to cover incidental takes.123 As the Assistant Solicitor discussed, 
ESA ITPs may be issued for activities unrelated to migratory birds, 
whereas for an MBTA special purpose permit the activity must be relat-
ed.124 The Assistant Solicitor further noted that for most ESA ITP hold-
                                                                                                                      
116 50 C.F.R. § 21.27. 
117 Id. 
118 Memorandum from Dir., Fish & Wildlife Serv., to Reg’l Dirs., Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 (Feb. 9, 1996), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCPAPP5.PDF, 
available at http://www.perma.cc/0v2PeBzs7GQ [hereinafter FWS ESA Incidental Take 
Memorandum]. 
119 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2006). 
120 FWS ESA Incidental Take Memorandum, supra note 118. 
121 Memorandum from Pete Raynor, Assistant Solicitor, Fish & Wildlife Branch, to John 
Rogers, Deputy Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2 (Feb. 5, 1996), http://www.fws.gov/ 
endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCPAPP5.PDF, available at http://www.perma.cc/0v2PeBzs 
7GQ [hereinafter Incidental Take Memorandum from Solicitor]. 
122 Id. at 4; FWS ESA Incidental Take Memorandum, supra note 118. 
123 Incidental Take Memorandum from Solicitor, supra note 121, at 2–3. 
124 See id. at 2. 
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ers to receive an MBTA special purpose permit as well, they would have 
to show a “compelling justification” for the take because their activities 
might not otherwise meet the necessary MBTA permit requirements.125 
The Assistant Solicitor stated that special purpose permits are “not nar-
rowly focused on incidental take” and suggested that the FWS should 
implement a permitting program that would specifically target the 
problems stemming from such takes.126 
 The FWS has issued special purpose permits not in conjunction 
with ESA ITPs in limited circumstances.127 For example, the FWS has 
issued permits for raptor abatement programs and to allow the take of 
birds in the course of rat eradication.128 In 2012, the FWS issued the 
first commercial, non-conservation incidental take permit under the 
special purpose permit provision.129 The Pacific Islands Regional office 
of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) had applied for an 
incidental take permit to operate a shallow-set longline fishery in Ha-
waii.130 The deployment and retrieval of fishing lines can injure or kill 
birds.131 In the NMFS’s application, the agency proposed to continue 
operations but examine current practices that might result in bird takes 
                                                                                                                      
125 Id. at 2–3. The regulation requires that special purpose permits only be issued if 
there is “a sufficient showing of benefit to the migratory bird resource, important research 
reasons, reasons of human concern for individual birds, or other compelling justification.” 
50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2012). There is, however, no definition of “other compelling justifica-
tion” in the MBTA or regulations made pursuant to the statute, so the FWS determines this 
on a case-by-case basis. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Pac. Region, Final Environmental 
Assessment: Issuance of an MBTA Permit to the National Marine Fisheries Service 
Authorizing Take of Seabirds in the Hawaii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery 5 
(2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/pacific/migratorybirds/pdf/NMFS%20Permit%20 
Final%20EA.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0GgqkMtW4Ts [hereinafter NMFS Permit 
Final EA]. 
126 Incidental Take Memorandum from Solicitor, supra note 121, at 3. 
127 See Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 8931, 8947 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2012)). 
128 Final Permit Conditions for Abatement Activities Using Raptors, 72 Fed. Reg. 
69705, 69705 (Dec. 10, 2007); U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Serv., Rec-
ord of Decision: Palmyra Atoll National Wildlife Refuge Rat Eradication Pro-
ject 7 (2011), available at http://www.fws.gov/palmyraatoll/ROD_Palmyra%20Rat%20 
Eradication_Signed.pdf and http://www.perma.cc/0zKpFs6Dr4C [hereinafter Palmyra 
Atoll ROD]. 
129 See Special Purpose Permit Application; Draft Environmental Assessment; Hawaii-
Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery, 77 Fed. Reg. 1501, 1502 ( Jan. 10, 2012); Permit Issued 
for Hawaiian Fishery, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.fws.gov/ 
pacific/news/news.cfm?id=2144375094, available at http://www.perma.cc/0YbNrjwZb8x. 
130 Special Purpose Permit Application; Draft Environmental Assessment; Hawaii-
Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery, 77 Fed. Reg. at 1501. 
131 Id. at 1502. 
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and report its findings to the FWS.132 After the FWS completed an En-
vironmental Assessment (EA) that found that no significant environ-
mental impact would result from the proposed activities, the FWS is-
sued a final permit on August 20, 2012.133 The FWS found “compelling 
justification” for the permit considering the conservation purposes un-
derlying the MBTA and related regulations.134 The final permit allows 
the fishery to continue business as usual and requires no changes or 
increased mitigation measures.135 
b. Take Authorization for Military Readiness Activities 
 The FWS has promulgated regulations that allow the incidental 
take of migratory birds during military readiness activities.136 Under the 
regulations, the military is allowed to incidentally take migratory birds, 
but it must consult with the FWS and develop conservation plans if the 
military determines that an “ongoing or proposed activit[y] . . . may 
result in a significant adverse effect on a population of a migratory bird 
species.”137 The Secretary may suspend authorization of the take if it 
determines that the authorization is not compatible with one of the 
migratory bird treaties.138 The Secretary may withdraw authorization if 
the activity “is likely to result in a significant adverse effect” on migrato-
ry birds and the military has failed to provide requested information, 
or failed to implement conservation measures or proper species moni-
toring.139 
 Center for Biological Diversity v. Pirie is central to the regulation of in-
cidental takes in military readiness activities.140 In that case, the Center 
for Biological Diversity (CBD) sued the Navy, under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), for violating the MBTA.141 The CBD alleged that 
                                                                                                                      
132 Id. 
133 Special Purpose Permit Application; Hawaii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery; 
Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 77 Fed. Reg. 
50153, 50153 (Aug. 20, 2012); Permit Issued for Hawaiian Fishery, supra note 129. 
134 See NMFS Permit Final EA, supra note 125, at 4, 5. 
135 Special Purpose Permit Application; Hawaii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery; 
Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
50154; NMFS Permit Final EA, supra note 125, at 23, 43. 
136 50 C.F.R. § 21.15 (2012). 
137 Id. at § 21.15(a)(1). 
138 Id. at § 21.15(b)(1). 
139 Id. at § 21.15(b)(2). 
140 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163–64 (D.D.C. 2002); Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migra-
tory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. at 8931–33 (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21 
(2012)). 
141 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 
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the Navy was killing migratory birds without a permit through various 
activities, such as dropping bombs and firing machine guns from air-
craft.142 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that 
the Navy’s lack of a permit violated the MBTA because its military read-
iness activities killed protected birds in the past and would kill birds in 
the future.143 The Navy had previously attempted to apply for a permit 
but was denied by the FWS.144 Although the FWS denied the permit, it 
stated that it would not use its enforcement discretion against the Na-
vy.145 The FWS’s choice to not enforce, however, did not preclude the 
CBD from using the APA to enforce the law against a federal agency.146 
 The court issued an injunction prohibiting further military readi-
ness activities in the area under dispute.147 This decision prompted 
Congress to issue an order requiring the Secretary to allow for inci-
dental takes in military readiness activities.148 
2. FWS Voluntary Guidance for Various Industries 
 The FWS has issued guidance for various industries and activities 
regarding mitigating or eliminating bird mortality.149 Adherence to 
guidance is voluntary, meaning that the guidelines offer no direct cause 
of action against non-compliant entities or the FWS.150 Furthermore, 
adherence to the guidelines does not absolve entities from liability un-
der the MBTA.151 
                                                                                                                      
142 Id. at 163, 165. 
143 Id. at 174. 
144 Id. at 166–67, 170. The Navy was denied a permit because it applied for a depredation 
permit, which is inapplicable to military readiness activities, and because at the time there 
were no regulations authorizing the FWS to issue permits for incidental takes. Id. at 167. 
145 Id. at 168. 
146 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 177. 
147 Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. 
8931, 8933 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2012)). 
148 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 
107–314, § 315, 116 Stat. 2458, 2509 (2002). 
149 Communication Tower Guidelines, supra note 115, at 2 (communication towers); 
Avian Protection Plan (APP) Guidelines (electric utilities), supra note 115, at 1; Land-
Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 1 (wind energy). 
150 See Communication Tower Guidelines, supra note 115, at 2; Avian Protection 
Plan (APP) Guidelines, supra note 115, at 1; Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, 
supra note 115, at 4. 
151 Communication Tower Guidelines, supra note 115, at 2; Avian Protection Plan 
(APP) Guidelines, supra note 115, at 15; Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra 
note 115, at 6. 
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 The voluntary guidelines for land-based wind energy create a 
tiered approach to the management of migratory bird risks.152 The 
guidelines contain five tiers, which correspond to different stages of the 
wind energy development process.153 At each tier, developers are en-
couraged to collect or provide certain information, such as assessing 
potential species of concern and identifying mitigation strategies.154 
The FWS must provide certain data, identify potential concerns, advise 
developers, and communicate with other agencies.155 The tiered ap-
proach allows for constant communication and evaluation at every step 
of the process.156 The FWS provides information and recommendations 
that developers are free to reject if the developers provide a reasoned 
explanation.157 Furthermore, the FWS has committed itself to answer-
ing requests for information and consultation within sixty days, and if 
the agency responds late, the developer must only adhere to the rec-
ommendations “if feasible.”158 
 Although compliance with the guidelines will not absolve a party 
from liability under the MBTA, the FWS will consider adherence to the 
guidelines and a party’s willingness to communicate when deciding to 
use its enforcement discretion.159 Whether a company’s reasoned rejec-
tion of FWS recommendations would constitute adherence to the guid-
ance remains unclear.160 The United States has yet to prosecute any 
wind companies under the MBTA.161 
III. Incidental Take Permits for the MBTA 
 The FWS should use the authority it possesses under § 704(a) of 
the MBTA to promulgate regulations requiring certain entities to ac-
                                                                                                                      
152 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 5, 7. 
153 Id. The five tiers are: preliminary site evaluation, site characterization, field studies 
and impact prediction, post construction studies to estimate impacts, and other post con-
struction studies and research. Id. at 7. 
154 Id. at 5. 
155 Id. 
156 See id. 
157 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4. 
158 Id. at 7. 
159 Id. at 6. 
160 See ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 56 (arguing that a developer’s 
documentation of disagreement constitutes adherence to guidelines); Land-Based Wind 
Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4 (noting that the failure to incorporate guidance 
may contribute to the FWS’s decision to enforce). 
161 Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1198; ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, 
at 76. 
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quire incidental take permits before commencing operations.162 First, 
statutory authority exists in the MBTA for the Secretary to promulgate 
regulations permitting incidental takes.163 Second, the existing mecha-
nisms to deal with incidental takes are insufficient.164 Third, an inci-
dental take permit program would resolve many of the issues surround-
ing incidental takes under the MBTA and reduce the amount of 
incidental bird deaths.165 
A. Statutory Authority for Incidental Take Permit Regulations  
Exists in the MBTA 
 Section 704(a) gives the FWS broad authority “to determine when, 
to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is compatible with the terms 
of the conventions to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, 
. . . of any [migratory] bird . . . and to adopt suitable regulations per-
mitting and governing the same.”166 Thus, the FWS may regulate inci-
dental takes via permits if (1) the statutory definition of “take” includes 
incidental takes, and (2) allowing permits for incidental takes comports 
with the four migratory bird treaties.167 
1. The Prohibitions in the MBTA Include Incidental Take 
 The prohibitions in the MBTA against the taking and killing of 
migratory birds include incidental takes, and a court would be likely to 
uphold such an interpretation by FWS.168 When reviewing challenges to 
an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute, courts must give 
                                                                                                                      
162 See Holland & Hart, LLC, supra note 11, at 3 (calling for an incidental take per-
mit program for natural gas pipeline companies); ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 
14, at 89 (calling for regulations allowing for incidental take permits for wind energy pro-
jects). Others have suggested congressional action as opposed to the administrative regula-
tory process. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1210 (arguing that Congress should 
amend the MBTA to allow for incidental take permits). This Note proposes use of the reg-
ulatory process rather than Congress because the FWS already possesses regulatory author-
ity to create a program; Congress does not need to authorize what is already authorized. 
Infra notes 168–187 and accompanying text. 
163 Infra notes 166–193 and accompanying text. 
164 Infra notes 194–243 and accompanying text. 
165 Infra notes 244–269 and accompanying text. 
166 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006) (emphasis added); Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Mi-
gratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. 8931, 8946 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 21 (2012)) (acknowledging the FWS’s broad authority to promulgate regulations 
in accordance with the treaties). 
167 See 16 U.S.C. § 704(a); Holland & Hart, LLC, supra note 11, at 6; ABC Rulemak-
ing Petition, supra note 14, at 66. 
168 Infra notes 174–187 and accompanying text. 
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agencies broad deference, as delineated in the seminal case Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.169 Chevron sets forth a 
two-part test for judicial deference to agency interpretation of stat-
utes.170 First, if Congress has unambiguously spoken on the issue, then 
the agency must follow the intent of Congress.171 The intent of Con-
gress is discerned through the statutory language itself, and the legisla-
tive history.172 If Congress’s intentions are unclear, courts must defer to 
the agency’s interpretation if the agency has construed the statute in a 
reasonable manner.173 
 The prohibitions in § 703 include: hunting, taking, capturing, kill-
ing, possessing, selling, bartering, attempting to kill, attempting to take, 
and attempting to sell.174 The MBTA does not define these terms, and 
none of the terms are qualified by adjectives such as direct, indirect, 
purposeful, intentional, or unintentional.175 In the absence of a statu-
tory definition, the words in a statute should receive their ordinary 
meaning, which can be found in dictionaries.176 Around the time of the 
MBTA’s enactment, the word take was defined as: “to grasp; seize . . . 
[t]o gain control or possession of . . . [t]o catch . . . to bear away; to re-
move . . . [t]o remove from life; to cause to die . . . [t]o get and take 
away wrongfully.”177 The term kill was defined as: “To deprive of life; 
put to death . . . to destroy or ruin; to suppress; to put an end to . . . 
[t]o slaughter.”178 Neither of these dictionary definitions unambiguous-
ly indicates that the words “take” and “kill” describe only purposeful or 
direct actions.179 
 The MBTA’s legislative history does not show clear congressional 
intent on the issue of incidental takes.180 The congressional debate fo-
                                                                                                                      
169 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984). 
170 Id. at 842–43. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. at 861–62. 
173 See id. at 843, 865. 
174 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). 
175 See id. §§ 703–712 (lacking a definitions section). 
176 Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995); 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). 
177 Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 2107 (1st 
ed. 1920). 
178 Id. at 1185. 
179 United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078–79 (D. Colo. 
1999); see Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, supra 
note 177, at 1185, 2107. 
180 Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–82; see H.R. Rep. No. 65–243, at 2 (1918) (attrib-
uting bird deaths to “the extension of agriculture, and particularly the draining on a large 
scale of swamps and meadows, together with improved firearms and a vast increase in the 
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cused on purposeful and direct conduct such as hunting and poaching 
because at the time, those activities were major threats to bird popula-
tions.181 As cases and congressional documents illustrate, however, 
Congress was concerned with the expansiveness of the MBTA beyond 
hunting and poaching.182 
 In 1986, after the FWS had won multiple incidental take cases, 
Congress amended the MBTA to add a mental state requirement for 
felony offenses.183 If Congress found the FWS’s court victories as prob-
lematic, it could have amended the MBTA to exclude incidental takes 
by either clarifying the language in § 703 or narrowing the misde-
meanor provision.184 Congress left the misdemeanor provision and 
§ 703 untouched, and in an accompanying Senate Report Congress 
acknowledged that a misdemeanor conviction does not require a show-
ing of intent.185 
 Congress has not clearly spoken on the issue of incidental takes in 
the MBTA.186 If the FWS were to implement an incidental take permit 
program, and if the program was challenged, under Chevron a review-
ing court would have to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the stat-
                                                                                                                      
number of sportsmen”) (quoting the Department of Agriculture); 55 Cong. Rec. 4816 
(1917) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“Nobody is trying to do anything here except to keep 
pothunters from killing game out of season, ruining the eggs of nesting birds, and ruining 
the country by it.”). 
181 United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 532 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d on 
other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978); Coggins & Patti, supra note 5, at 168; see 56 
Cong. Rec. 7357 (1918) (statement of Rep. Fees) (“The needs of the farmer call loudly for 
[the birds] protection . . . [t]he food requirements . . . also demand their protection from 
the market hunter.”). 
182 See Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 532; 56 Cong. Rec. 7455 (1918) (statement of 
Rep. Mondell) (“What are you going to do in a case like this: a barefoot boy . . . largely 
through inadvertence and without meaning anything wrong, happens to throw a stone at 
and strikes and injures a robin’s nest . . . whereupon he is hauled before a court for viola-
tion of [the migratory bird treaty].”). 
183 Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–645, § 501, 100 Stat. 
3582, 3590; United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2nd Cir. 1978); Corbin Farm 
Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 540. 
184 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (noting “that when 
‘Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion’”) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1077 (noting “that Congress reviewed 
and substantively amended the MBTA in 1986 without attempting to vitiate the holdings of 
FMC . . . and Corbin Farm Service”). 
185 S. Rep. No. 99–445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128; see 100 
Stat. at 3590 (amending only the felony provision). 
186 Supra notes 174–185 and accompanying text. 
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ute if the interpretation is reasonable.187 Because including incidental 
takes under the language of the MBTA is reasonable, a reviewing court 
would have to defer to the FWS’s interpretation, and thus an incidental 
take permit program would likely survive judicial review.188 
2. Permitting Incidental Takes Furthers the Goals of the Migratory 
Bird Treaties 
 Section 704(a) of the MBTA only allows for regulations that are 
compatible with the treaties between the United States and Canada, 
Mexico, Japan, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.).189 
Incidental take permits would further the conservation goals of the var-
ious migratory bird treaties.190 All the treaties contemplate regulations 
for the take of migratory birds.191 Furthermore, the treaties contemplate 
conservation goals broader than only those related to hunting and 
poaching.192 Incidental takes contribute to bird deaths, which the con-
ventions aim to reduce.193 A mandatory permit process would force ap-
plicants to consider the consequences of projects in relation to migrato-
ry birds and take action to reduce such consequences before 
commencement of a project.194 
                                                                                                                      
187 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”). 
188 See id.; infra notes 174–185 and accompanying text. 
189 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a), 704(a). 
190 See U.S.-Can. 1995 Protocol, supra note 38 (promoting the long-term conservation 
of migratory birds); U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 37, at 4649; U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra 
note 37, at 3331 (promoting the proper management of migratory birds); U.S.-Mex. Trea-
ty, supra note 37, at 1312 (calling for the protection of migratory birds); Migratory Bird 
Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. 8931, 8946 (Feb. 28, 
2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2012)) (finding regulations authorizing takes inci-
dental to military readiness activities consistent with the four migratory bird treaties). 
191 U.S.-Can. 1995 Protocol, supra note 38; U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 37, at 4651; 
U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 37, at 3333; U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 37, at 1312. 
192 U.S.-Can. 1995 Protocol, supra note 38; U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 37, at 4649; 
U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 37, at 3331; U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 37, at 1312. The 
Mexico treaty explicitly discusses provisions on hunting, however, it broadly allows for each 
of the contracting parties to develop their own laws and regulations promoting “the utili-
zation of said birds rationally for purposes of sport, food, commerce, and industry.” U.S.-
Mex. Treaty, supra note 37, at 1312–13. 
193 See U.S.-Can. 1995 Protocol, supra note 38; U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 37, at 
4649–50; U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 37, at 3331; U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 37, at 1312; 
Bird Mortality Fact Sheet, supra note 8 (noting that incidental takes contribute to bird 
deaths). 
194 See infra notes 244–269 and accompanying text. 
2014] Incidental Take Permits Under the MBTA 189 
B. The Existing Mechanisms to Deal with Incidental Take Are Insufficient 
 The FWS currently has three mechanisms to address the issue of 
incidental takes: general enforcement discretion, existing permits, and 
voluntary guidelines.195 None of these options provides companies with 
certainty as to the legality of their actions under the MBTA, nor do they 
effectively deal with the problem of declining bird populations.196 
1. General Enforcement Discretion 
 The FWS enforces the MBTA and has discretion in choosing which 
violations to refer for prosecution.197 Thus, the FWS may choose not to 
enforce the MBTA against certain entities that violate the statute 
through incidental takes.198 An assurance against enforcement by the 
FWS might provide slight comfort to a potential violator, but such an 
assurance cannot provide total security against prosecution.199 In Center 
for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, the FWS assured the Navy that it would not 
enforce the MBTA against the Navy for the incidental take of migratory 
birds on an island.200 Because the Navy is a federal agency, though, a 
citizens group was able to sue under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.201 The court held that the Navy violated the MBTA because the tak-
ing and killing of migratory birds without an MBTA permit is illegal.202 
 More generally, reliance on the FWS’s enforcement discretion is 
problematic because agency policies and goals can change from presi-
dential administration to presidential administration.203 Thus, an assur-
                                                                                                                      
195 Supra notes 116–161 and accompanying text; infra notes 196–197 and accompany-
ing text. 
196 See infra notes 196–243 and accompanying text (discussing the drawbacks to cur-
rent FWS MBTA enforcement). 
197 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168 
(D.D.C. 2002); 50 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2012). 
198 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (restating the FWS’s “enforce-
ment discretion” for certain activities that might violate the MBTA); Lilley & Firestone, 
supra note 5, at 1198 (noting that the FWS has yet to use its enforcement discretion against 
wind energy projects). 
199 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (noting the FWS’s choice not to 
enforce the MBTA does not preclude enforcement by citizen groups under the APA). 
200 Id. at 166, 168. 
201 Id. at 175. 
202 Id. at 174. 
203 See Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modern Administrative Law: Changing Administra-
tions and Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 Ecology L.Q. 657, 658, 674 (2008) (dis-
cussing the ability of agencies to change policies from one administration to the next). 
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ance against enforcement that conformed with the policy of one ad-
ministration might not conform with the policy of another.204 
 Furthermore, a lack of guidance on the implementation of MBTA 
regulations prevents consistency in judicial interpretations of the Act’s 
scope for those cases that do reach the courts.205 For example, in United 
States v. Moon Lake Electric Association and United States v. Apollo Energies, 
Inc. the courts hinged MBTA liability on the companies’ ability to rea-
sonably foresee the bird deaths.206 In contrast, in United States v. Brigham 
Oil & Gas, L.P. the court dismissed FWS’s case against three oil and gas 
companies even though the companies could have reasonably foreseen 
the bird deaths.207 If the court in Brigham would have used the proxi-
mate causation analysis from Moon Lake and Apollo Energies, however, 
the FWS would have survived a motion to dismiss.208 The MBTA is a 
federal statute and should apply uniformly across the nation so that the 
FWS may successfully enforce it.209 
 Allowing the FWS to use its discretion to refrain from enforcing 
the MBTA does not further the conservation goals of the treaties or the 
Act—inaction regarding bird deaths does not contribute to bird con-
servation.210 If the FWS routinely does not refer a certain industry or 
                                                                                                                      
204 See id. 
205 See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 2010) (find-
ing a lawfully operating oil driller liable under the MBTA); United States v. Brigham Oil & 
Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1214 (D.N.D. 2012) (dismissing MBTA violations against 
lawfully operating oil and gas companies). 
206 See Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 690–91 (discussing the application of the proximate 
cause standard); Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (discussing the need to prove proxi-
mate causation to “obtain a guilty verdict”). 
207 Brigham, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1214; see, e.g., Statement of Probable Cause, supra note 
111, at 4–5. 
208 See Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 682–83, 690–91 (reasoning that defendant’s previous 
violations, coupled with participation in the information campaign, was sufficient to prove 
that defendant Apollo could reasonably foresee the harm); Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 
1085 (discussing the need to prove proximate causation to “obtain a guilty verdict”); e.g., 
Statement of Probable Cause, supra note 111, at 4–5 (noting that the charged company 
had previously observed dead birds on its property and received information regarding 
mitigation measures). 
209 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (presenting migratory bird deaths 
as an issue of national interest and discouraging reliance on inconsistent state laws). 
210 See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (declaring it unlawful to kill or take birds); U.S.-Can. 1995 
Protocol, supra note 38 (binding the parties to the conservation of birds through regula-
tion and enforcement); U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 37, at 4649, 4651 (promoting 
proper bird management and binding the parties to prohibit the taking of birds except in 
limited circumstances); U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 37, at 3331, 3333 (promoting proper 
bird management and binding the parties to prohibit the taking of birds except in limited 
circumstances); U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 37, at 1312 (binding the parties to the con-
servation of birds through regulations and laws). 
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type of activity for prosecution, affected actors have little incentive to 
change their behavior and try to mitigate or eliminate the effects of 
their actions on birds.211 
2. Existing Permits and Regulations 
 The only existing regulation under the MBTA that may apply to 
incidental takes outside of the military readiness context is the regula-
tion allowing special purpose permits.212 Special purpose permits have 
some promise for regulating incidental takes, but they are ultimately 
insufficient because they have been used only in limited circumstances, 
and the requirements for approval might not fit well with various indus-
tries.213 
 As the FWS noted, “[s]pecial purpose permits may be issued for 
actions whereby take of migratory birds could result as an unintended 
consequence. . . . [h]owever, the Service has previously issued such 
permits only in very limited circumstances.”214 Special purpose permits 
are issued in conjunction with incidental take permits (ITPs) under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), but these permits only cover the inci-
dental take of endangered bird species and not the hundreds of other 
non-endangered species.215 The FWS has issued only a small number of 
special purpose permits outside of the ESA ITP context.216 For example, 
the FWS issued a special purpose permit allowing the incidental take of 
birds in the course of a rat eradication program in the Pacific Islands.217 
The agency issued the permit because the eradication of the rats would 
lead to long-term benefits for migratory bird populations.218 The FWS 
has also issued special purpose permits for raptor abatement programs, 
                                                                                                                      
211 See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1209 (describing how the lack of proper en-
forcement by the FWS discourages the wind energy industry from “preventing or minimiz-
ing wildlife impacts”). 
212 See 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.1–.61 (2012) (describing types of migratory bird permits and no-
tably not including civilian incidental take permits). 
213 Infra notes 213–234 and accompanying text. 
214 Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. 
at 8947 (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2012)). 
215 See FWS ESA Incidental Take Memorandum, supra note 118. 
216 See Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 8947 (noting that the FWS has issued special purpose permits “only in very limited 
circumstances”). 
217 Palmyra Atoll ROD, supra note 128, at 2, 7. 
218 Id. at 6–7. 
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which train raptors to “take birds . . . to mitigate depredation and nui-
sance problems, including threats to human health and safety.”219 
 Most recently, the FWS issued an incidental take permit to the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for the incidental take of birds 
at the Hawaii shallow-set longline fishery.220 This permit was the first 
incidental take special purpose permit issued by the FWS for a com-
mercial, non-conservation activity.221 A citizens group challenged the 
permit and claimed that the issuance of the permit was “arbitrary, ca-
pricious, and contrary to the [MBTA].”222 The petitioners alleged that 
allowing incidental takes under the permit was beyond the scope of a 
special purpose permit because the fishery did not meet any of the cri-
teria necessary to obtain such a permit.223 In August 2013, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Hawaii disagreed with plaintiffs and up-
held the use of special purpose permits for incidental takes related to 
commercial, non-conservation activities.224 This expansion of the spe-
cial purpose permit is still new, however, and has seen limited use.225 
 Furthermore, under the special purpose permit regulation, an en-
tity must apply for a special purpose permit before it may take a migrato-
ry bird in any way not allowed by other permits.226 In practice, however, 
special purpose permits have not been used for incidental takes nor 
have they always been required before the commencement of an activi-
ty that might result in incidental takes.227 For example, the Hawaii shal-
                                                                                                                      
219 Final Permit Conditions for Abatement Activities Using Raptors, 72 Fed. Reg. 69705 
(Dec. 10, 2007). 
220 Special Purpose Permit Application; Hawaii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery; 
Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 77 Fed. Reg. 
50153, 50153 (Aug. 20, 2012); Permit Issued for Hawaiian Fishery, supra note 129. 
221 Special Purpose Permit Application; Draft Environmental Assessment; Hawaii-
Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery, 77 Fed. Reg. 1501, 1502 ( Jan. 10, 2012). 
222 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–4, Turtle Island Restoration 
Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 1:12-cv-00594-SOM-RLP (D. Haw. filed Nov. 2, 2012) 
[hereinafter Turtle Island Complaint]. 
223 Id. at 26–27. 
224 Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 12–00594 SOM–
RLP, 2013 WL 4511314, at *10–12 (D. Haw. 2013). 
225 See Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 8947 (noting that the FWS has issued special purpose permits “only in very limited 
circumstances”); Special Purpose Permit Application; Draft Environmental Assessment; Ha-
waii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery, 77 Fed. Reg. at 1501 (noting that, if issued, the Ha-
waii fishery permit will be the first commercial non-conservation special purpose permit). 
226 50 C.F.R. § 21.27(a) (2012). 
227 See Special Purpose Permit Application; Hawaii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery; 
Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
50153–54 (notably lacking discussion of the time-lapse between the commencement of 
fishery operations and the permit application); Special Purpose Permit Application; Draft 
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low-set longline fishery had been in operation since the late 1980s but 
did not apply for a special purpose permit until 2012 and was not pe-
nalized for the delay.228 
 In addition, certain industries or entities whose operations result 
in incidental takes might have problems fulfilling the permit require-
ments for special purpose permits.229 First, a special purpose permit 
may only be issued for “special purpose activities related to migratory 
birds.”230 Whether the operation of wind turbines or communications 
towers is related to migratory birds, for example, is not immediately 
apparent.231 The Department of the Interior and the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Hawaii however, have stated that because such 
activities can cause bird deaths, the activities are related to migratory 
birds.232 Second, an applicant must also “make[] a sufficient showing of 
benefit to the migratory bird resource, important research reasons, rea-
sons of human concern for individual birds, or other compelling justi-
fication.”233 Applicants such as wind turbine or transmission line opera-
tors would most likely have to show a benefit to migratory birds, or a 
“compelling justification.”234 Currently, no standards exist for what con-
                                                                                                                      
Environmental Assessment; Hawaii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
1502 (stating that the fishery commenced operations in the 1980s); Incidental Take Mem-
orandum from Solicitor, supra note 121, at 3 (noting that special purpose permits are not 
narrowly focused on incidental takes); Dep’t of the Interior Wind Turbine Guidelines 
Advisory Comm., White Paper 14 (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://www.fws.gov/habitat 
conservation/windpower/Subcommittee/Legal/Reports/Wind_Turbine_Advisory_Comm 
ittee_Legal_Subcommittee_White_Paper_%28Final_As_Posted%29.pdf and http://www. 
perma.cc/0W27cH28Gs4 (noting that the FWS has not endorsed an interpretation of the 
special purpose permits that could allow the permits to be used for incidental takes). 
228 See Special Purpose Permit Application; Hawaii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery; 
Final Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
50153–54 (notably lacking discussion of the time-lapse between the commencement of 
fishery operations and the permit application); Special Purpose Permit Application; Draft 
Environmental Assessment; Hawaii-Based Shallow-Set Longline Fishery, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
1502 (stating that the fishery commenced operations in the 1980s). 
229 See 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (requiring that special purpose activities relate to migratory 
birds); Incidental Take Memorandum from Solicitor, supra note 121, at 2 (highlighting the 
difficulties that entities whose activities result in incidental takes may have with fulfilling 
special purpose permit requirements). 
230 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (emphasis added). 
231 See Incidental Take Memorandum from Solicitor, supra note 121, at 2 (implying that 
some activities resulting in incidental takes will appear to be unrelated to birds). 
232 Turtle Island Restoration Network, 2013 WL 4511314, at *9; Incidental Take Memo-
randum from Solicitor, supra note 121, at 2. 
233 50 C.F.R. § 21.27. 
234 See Incidental Take Memorandum from Solicitor, supra note 121, at 2–3 (noting 
that entities whose actions result in incidental takes require either a compelling justifica-
tion or perhaps a showing of a benefit to migratory birds to receive a special purpose per-
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stitutes a compelling justification, so absent a showing of a benefit to 
migratory birds, the FWS would have to engage in a cumbersome case-
by-case analysis.235 
3. Voluntary Guidelines 
 Voluntary guidelines that the FWS develops are an inadequate 
means of reducing incidental takes and do not provide a way for entities 
to comply with the MBTA.236 For example, the land-based wind energy 
guidelines are entirely voluntary and non-binding.237 The guidelines set 
forth an impressive five-tier plan involving frequent consultation and 
communication, but in practice the plan is not effective.238 Wind energy 
developers are not required to initiate the process delineated in the 
guidelines, and as a result the FWS frequently has problems collecting 
information and is sometimes wholly unaware of proposed wind pro-
jects.239 Furthermore, even if developers engage in communication with 
the FWS, they may still continue with high-risk projects against the will 
of the agency as long as they provide a reasoned explanation.240 
                                                                                                                      
mit); White Paper, supra note 226, at 14 (hypothesizing that a wind energy facility could 
receive a special purpose permit by showing a benefit to migratory birds or a compelling 
justification). 
235 See NMFS Permit Final EA, supra note 125, at 5 (noting that “compelling justifica-
tion” is undefined in the regulations and therefore is applied on a case-by-case basis). 
236 Infra notes 236–243 and accompanying text; see Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 
1209 (describing how the voluntary guidelines are “not viewed as particularly helpful”); 
ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 51–57 (describing the inadequacy of volun-
tary wind guidelines). 
237 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4. 
238 Id. at 5; see ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 51–57 (describing the inad-
equacies of the voluntary wind guidelines). The FWS has attempted to weigh in on wind 
energy projects, but developers have not always been responsive to FWS criticism. See South-
west Power Pool, Inc., ER11–3833 (FERC Oct. 18, 2011) (letter from Michael D. George, Fish 
& Wildlife Serv., to Jay Prothro, BP Wind Energy North America, Inc.) (“British Petroleum 
representatives . . . have repeatedly been advised of the unacceptability of the proposed BP wind 
project . . . given its high risk to whooping cranes and other migratory birds.”) (emphasis 
added); Letter from Scott Hicks, Fish & Wildlife Serv., to Xio Cordoba, Heritage Sustainable 
Energy (Nov. 4, 2011), http://docs.wind-watch.org/Garden-Peninsula-Wind_2011-Nov-4-
FWS.pdf, available at http://www.perma.cc/0gWjXVTpfHk (“[W]e must once again recom-
mend that you not construct a commercial wind energy development . . . because of the high 
potential for avian mortalities.”) (emphasis added). 
239 See ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 79–80 (citing examples where the 
FWS has been unaware of proposed wind projects); Land-Based Wind Energy Guide-
lines, supra note 115, at 4 (noting the voluntary nature of the guidelines). 
240 ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 78; see Land-Based Wind Energy 
Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4 (noting the voluntary nature of the guidelines and the 
ability of developers to reject FWS advice). 
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 The FWS cannot assure developers with certainty that they will not 
be prosecuted for incidental takes, but the FWS will consider adher-
ence to the voluntary guidelines and communication with the FWS for 
enforcement purposes.241 What constitutes adherence to the guidelines 
remains somewhat unclear, but a reasoned explanation rejecting FWS 
recommendations could count as adherence.242 Nevertheless, if the 
FWS disagrees with the reasoned explanation and the project ends up 
incidentally taking birds, the FWS still has full authority to enforce the 
MBTA.243 If the FWS decides to forgo enforcement in light of the rea-
soned explanation, the FWS is essentially allowing the developer to take 
birds without a permit.244 
C. Incidental Take Permits: Furthering the Protection of Birds 
 The current system for addressing incidental takes under the 
MBTA is a combination of enforcement discretion, limited regulations, 
and voluntary guidelines.245 The system is broken; it currently allows 
the incidental take of migratory birds without a permit and does not 
further the goals of the migratory bird treaties.246 An effective inci-
dental take permit program would resolve many of the current issues 
with enforcement and judicial review.247 
                                                                                                                      
241 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 6; supra notes 159–161 
and accompanying text. 
242 See ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 78 (arguing that communication 
with the FWS, even in the form of rejection of the FWS’s advice, constitutes adherence to 
the guidelines); Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4, 6 (noting 
that developers may accept or reject the non-binding advice from the FWS, and that com-
munication with the FWS is included in enforcement discretion considerations). 
243 See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a); Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4 
(noting that the FWS reserves the right to initiate enforcement proceedings for any unlaw-
ful takes that do not comply with FWS regulations or the guidelines). 
244 See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (stating that it is unlawful to take migratory birds without a 
permit); ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 79 (noting that the FWS’s decision 
not to enforce provides industries with a “free pass to violate federal wildlife law”). 
245 Supra notes 116–161, 196–197 and accompanying text. 
246 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 168, 174 (noting that the FWS as-
sured the Navy that it would not enforce the MBTA against it, but also finding that a viola-
tion had occurred); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1214 (concluding that the current 
system to address incidental takes is ineffective); Holland & Hart, LLC, supra note 11, at 
1–2 (petitioning the FWS to promulgate meaningful regulations to reduce uncertainty for 
natural gas pipeline companies in complying with the MBTA); supra notes 38–50 and ac-
companying text (describing the migratory bird treaties and the commitments made by 
the contracting parties to the conservation of migratory birds). 
247 See infra notes 247–269 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of an inci-
dental take permit program). 
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 The FWS should promulgate incidental take permit regulations by 
industry or type of activity.248 Broad permits, such as a general inci-
dental take permit, might be too expansive to address differences be-
tween the variety of activities that can cause incidental takes.249 An in-
dustry-based or activity-based permit system would be tailored more 
specifically towards various entities and their effects on migratory 
birds.250 Furthermore, the FWS has already expended a considerable 
amount of resources to research and develop voluntary guidelines on 
an individual basis by industry or activity.251 
 An industry-wide wind energy incidental take permit would allow 
a developer to obtain a statutorily authorized permit that assures the 
developer that its project complies with the law.252 Currently, a devel-
oper can attempt adherence to the voluntary guidelines, but the cur-
rent guidelines do not provide assurance to developers that their 
conduct conforms with MBTA requirements.253 Developers can also 
theoretically apply for special purpose permits under the MBTA.254 
Special purpose permits have traditionally been issued in limited cir-
cumstances, though.255 
                                                                                                                      
248 See Holland & Hart, LLC, supra note 11, at 33–36 (describing incidental take 
permit program options and their advantages and disadvantages); infra notes 248–250 and 
accompanying text. 
249 See Holland & Hart, LLC, supra note 11, at 36 (noting the difficulties of a broad 
incidental take permit program). 
250 Id. at 33. Each industry or activity that affects migratory birds is different and af-
fects birds in different ways. See id. at 35 (recognizing the various impacts that different 
industries have on migratory birds). For example, in the wind industry, siting of projects 
has a great effect on bird mortality. Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 
115, at 1 (noting the importance of siting in reducing bird mortality in wind projects). In 
the oil and gas industry, the type of equipment and techniques used affect mortality. Apollo 
Energies, 611 F.3d at 682 (finding that oil drilling equipment killed migratory birds). 
251 See Communication Tower Guidelines, supra note 115, at 2 (communication tow-
ers); Avian Protection Plan (APP) Guidelines (electric utilities), supra note 115, at 1; 
Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 1 (wind energy). 
252 See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (prohibiting the take of migratory birds unless authorized by 
regulations); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 5, at 1209 (emphasizing the need for “clear and 
concrete guidance” from the FWS). 
253 See Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 6 (providing quali-
fied assurances against enforcement for wind companies that adhere to the guidelines); 
supra notes 235–243 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of the guidelines to 
protect companies from MBTA enforcement). 
254 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2012); White Paper, supra note 226, at 14 (noting the possibility 
of using special purpose permits for wind projects, but that the FWS has not endorsed 
such a use). 
255 See 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.1–.61 (describing the types of migratory bird permits and nota-
bly not including civilian incidental take permits); White Paper, supra note 226, at 14 
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 The existence of an incidental take permit program would increase 
efficient enforcement of the MBTA.256 For example, if the FWS were to 
require wind developers to obtain permits before construction, the 
agency would be aware of proposed wind projects before they are sit-
ed.257 Furthermore, as part of the permit process, the FWS could re-
quire developers to meet certain conditions before approval.258 For ex-
ample, a wind energy incidental take permit could require the FWS, 
before issuing a permit, to find that a developer will conduct adequate 
preconstruction monitoring, or that no practicable alternatives exist.259 
A permit applicant would not be able to reject required permit condi-
tions with a reasoned explanation, as a developer is currently able to do 
under the voluntary wind energy guidelines.260 Permits offer real and 
substantive bird protections that reduce the chance of incidental take.261 
 The FWS may also create provisions, such as those found in the 
military incidental take authorization, for the suspension and with-
drawal of permits.262 This would allow the FWS to suspend or withdraw 
permits that it issued improperly, or permits that no longer further the 
conservation purposes of the treaties and the MBTA.263 Currently, the 
FWS cannot penalize entities solely for noncompliance with the volun-
                                                                                                                      
(noting the possibility of using special purpose permits for wind projects, but that the FWS 
has not endorsed such a use). 
256 Infra notes 256–269 and accompanying text; see supra notes 247–254 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the benefits of an industry-based or activity-based permit system). 
257 See ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 79–80 (noting that without man-
datory permit requirements, the FWS is often unaware of proposed wind projects). 
258 See id. at 102–04 (presenting model required permit conditions); Holland & 
Hart, LLC, supra note 11, at 39 (discussing the use of FWS information to develop permit 
conditions for natural gas transmission projects). Other migratory bird permits have con-
ditions; for example, to obtain a special purpose permit, an applicant must show the FWS 
that the project is related to birds, and also benefits bird populations, has important re-
search implications, concerns individual birds, or has another compelling justification. 50 
C.F.R. § 21.27 (2012). 
259 ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 103–04. 
260 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (noting that the FWS denied the 
Navy a depredation permit because such a permit was inapplicable to the Navy’s activities); 
NMFS Permit Final EA, supra note 125, at 5 (finding that the applicant will have to show 
a compelling justification for the FWS to issue a special purpose permit); Land-Based 
Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4 (noting that the guidelines are entirely 
voluntary and can be rejected with a “reasoned justification”). 
261 See Fjetland, supra note 15, at 67 (noting that an incidental take permit program 
would decrease bird mortality); ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 82 (recog-
nizing that a permit program would increase information collection on bird impacts). 
262 See 50 C.F.R. § 21.15(b) (authorizing the suspension or withdrawal of military inci-
dental take permits). 
263 See id. (outlining the grounds for withdrawal or suspension of military incidental 
take permits). 
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tary guidelines before takes have occurred.264 Instead, the FWS must 
wait until birds have been killed before it can initiate action against a 
wind developer, and even then, the outcome is uncertain.265 
 Incidental take permits can also offer increased enforcement of 
the MBTA through citizen suits.266 Because the MBTA offers no private 
right of action, citizens must challenge violations of the MBTA through 
the Administrative Procedure Act.267 APA suits may only be brought 
against federal agency actions that are directly in violation of the 
MBTA.268 Incidental take permits would constitute a federal agency ac-
tion, thereby allowing citizens to challenge the FWS’s issuance of per-
mits as arbitrary and capricious under the APA.269 Citizen involvement 
is an important factor in the enforcement and shaping of environmen-
tal statutes.270 
                                                                                                                      
264 See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (making it unlawful to take migratory birds); Land-Based Wind 
Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4 (noting the voluntary nature of the guidelines). 
265 See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (making it unlawful to take migratory birds); Land-Based 
Wind Energy Guidelines, supra note 115, at 4 (noting the FWS’s right to initiate en-
forcement proceedings against any unlawful take regardless of an entity’s compliance with 
the voluntary guidelines); supra notes 204–208 and accompanying text (discussing the 
uncertainty in the judicial review of current incidental take jurisprudence). 
266 See Fund for Animals v. Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209, 217 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding 
that using the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, citizens may sue the FWS for issu-
ing a permit that violates the MBTA regulations); ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 
14, at 94 (noting that when a federal agency acts by issuing a permit, the action will trigger 
the possibility of suits under the APA). 
267 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (allowing aggrieved citizens 
to challenge agency actions); 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (notably lacking a citizen suit provi-
sion); Fund for Animals, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 217 (finding that using the APA’s arbitrary and 
capricious standard, citizens may sue the FWS for issuing a permit that violates the MBTA 
regulations). 
268 5 U.S.C. § 702; see ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra note 14, at 93 (recognizing 
that the only way private citizens can enforce the MBTA is through the APA’s citizen suit 
provision). 
269 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706 (allowing challenged final federal agency actions to be re-
viewed under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard); ABC Rulemaking Petition, supra 
note 14, at 94 (recognizing that the “issuance of a federal incidental take permit under the 
MBTA will constitute a final federal agency action thereby triggering the availability of APA 
review”). 
270 James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 
Widener L. Rev. 1, 3 (2003); Kerry D. Florio, Attorneys’ Fees in Environmental Citizen Suits: 
Should Prevailing Defendants Recover?, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 707, 709 (2000); see Lilley 
& Firestone, supra note 5, at 1212 (recognizing the need for citizen involvement in envi-
ronmental law enforcement). 
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Conclusion 
 In the late 1800s, large-scale hunting and poaching combined with 
a lack of regulations created a grim situation for many migratory bird 
species. Birds were seen as an infinite source of food and income rather 
than a valuable resource in need of protection. In the early 1900s, after 
a series of failed attempts to regulate their slaughter at the federal level, 
the United States successfully negotiated and executed a treaty with 
Canada for the protection of migratory birds. The Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act (MBTA) now implements the terms of four migratory bird treaties 
and makes it unlawful to kill or take migratory birds without a permit. 
 Initially, the MBTA was used to prosecute purposeful conduct di-
rected at birds such as hunting and poaching. Beginning in the 1970s, 
however, the United States began to prosecute bird deaths that resulted 
from activities not directed at birds. For example, the FWS has brought 
cases against oil companies, pesticide manufacturers, and electric com-
panies. This expansion of MBTA prosecutions has been problematic 
because the FWS does not issue permits for the incidental take of birds. 
Thus, entities whose actions result in incidental takes of migratory birds 
are not able to comply with the MBTA. 
 Currently, to deal with incidental takes in violation of the MBTA, 
the FWS relies on its enforcement discretion, existing regulations, and 
voluntary guidelines. This current system neither furthers the protec-
tion of migratory birds nor provides entities with a means of fully com-
plying with the MBTA. The FWS has the authority, however, to promul-
gate meaningful regulations regarding incidental takes, and should use 
this authority to develop incidental take permits. Incidental take per-
mits, especially those focused on specific industries or activities, would 
provide entities with a means to comply with the MBTA, while at the 
same time offering stronger protections for migratory birds. 
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